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Compliance|Research>The Hitlist

The Hitlist: International Travel

International travel is common in today’s business world.  Many times businesses assume that their standard policies can apply to any international destination.  We recently had a client contact us about traveling to their international office in a country that is typically known for lacking respect for other’s privacy.  They asked us, considering this client would be discussing corporate trade secrets and other senstive info, what precautions they should take.

We gave them a list of recommendations and explained that many of these would not make travel simple from a technological standpoint, but would provide them the most security benefit.  These recommendations are not for travel to any country, but to countries where government’s can have a pervasive nature with regard to network communications.

Some recommendations for consideration:

  • Assume that all communication will be monitored
  • Understand that some of these countries put higher priority on Intellectual Property and Trade Secrets than they do personal or financial information
  • Take a clean machine with no data – some countries may even confiscate or copy data at the border
    • Lock the machine down to the minimum amount of use possible
    • Make sure personal firewalls are set to be very restrictive
    • Whitelist applications if possible
    • Take data only on encrypted removable media – many countries such as China, Israel, and Russia have limitations on encryption tools
    • Encrypt hard drives
  • Communications
    • Do not use Bluetooth or WiFi
    • Avoid connecting to the internet at all
    • Any time you connect to the internet, make a secure connection to the US as quickly as possible using technologies that provide virtual desktops or VPN connectivity and preferably with multi-factor authentication if allowed.  If VPN connections are not allowed in a particular country, plan on limited to no use of the internet.
  • Make sure mobile devices are encrypted and managed with MDM – again if country restrictions allow
    • Communication should be limited, even email.  Again, assume all communication will be monitored
    • Beware if you get a certificate error while downloading anything.  This may mean that someone has brokered the connection
  • Upon return, format all electronic media that made the travel, and under no circumstance should anything be plugged back into a network

Again, these are just a few things to consider when traveling to certain countries that may have a governmental interest in data and communications.

Categories
Uncategorized

WannaCry – Worldwide Ransomware Attack – Updated

A widespread ransomware attack has spread across the globe infecting tens of thousands computers in as many countries, including the United States, United Kingdom, Spain, Russia, Taiwan, France, and Japan.  The software can run in many languages.  There have been several versions and updates, but the ways to protect remain the same.  Recently, a decryption tool has been discovered – see here.

Technical Details

Initial reports indicate the hacker or hacking group behind the WannaCry campaign is gaining access to enterprise servers either through a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) compromise or the exploitation of a critical Windows SMB vulnerability.  Microsoft released a security update for the MS17-010 vulnerability on March 14, 2017.  According to open sources, one possible infection vector is via phishing emails.

The WannaCry ransomware received and analyzed by US-CERT is a loader that contains an AES-encrypted DLL.  During runtime, the loader writes a file to disk named “t.wry.”  The malware then uses an embedded 128-bit key to decrypt this file.  This DLL, is then loaded into the parent process, is the actual Wanna Cry Ransomware responsible for encrypting the user’s files.  Using this cryptographic loading method, the WannaCry DLL is never directly exposed on disk and not vulnerable to antivirus software scans.  Subsequent versions are manifested differently.

What to do to protect against Wana Decrypt0r aka WannaCry

1.    Patch all Windows Operating Systems

  1. For supported Operating Systems see MS17-010
  2. Emergency Patch for Windows XP and Windows 2003 is here

2.    Run a port scan and or Vulnerability Assessment against your firewalls. 

Ensure that Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and SMB protocols are not open to the internet.  These are typically on ports 3389, 445, and 139 respectively, but can be mapped to different ports on your firewall.  These configurations are security best practice.

Verify Other Protections Are working as expected.

*************************************IMPORTANT******************************************

Do NOT assume you are safe just because you have purchased and installed a product.

**********************************************************************************************

3.    Backups

Review your backups to ensure that they are working as expected.  Test restores of critical data.

4.    SPAM Filter

Enable strong spam filters to prevent phishing e-mails from reaching the end users.  Most enterprise filters should detect WannaCry.

5.    Antivirus & Malware Protections

  1. Ensure that real-time scanning enabled to detect file downloads, email attachments, and web links
  2. Ensure that scan engines are up to date and that definitions are downloaded and regularly deployed – at least daily. We recommend more frequently
  3. Configure anti-virus and anti-malware solutions to conduct routine scans
  4. Inventory protected machines to ensure that all have products installed and that they are functional

WannaCry Remediation

  • Isolate compromised computer systems.
    1. Unplug from network to prevent spreading
    2. Power down other computers or unplug network access switches during eradication
    3. Wipe and reload infected machines
    4. Paying the ransom does not guarantee you recovery
  • Ensure that proper logging is enabled and preserved on key systems.
  • Contact law enforcement. Contact a local FBI field office upon discovery to report an intrusion and request assistance.  Maintain and provide relevant logs.
  • Implement your security incident response and business continuity plan.
  • Ideally, organizations should not store critical data on workstations. Critical data should reside on centralized storage systems.  Storage systems should have complete, verified, and tested backups.  Ofen the most efficient response is to restore data from a known clean backup.

Signatures

 

File name:  @WanaDecryptor@.exe

 

Confirmed indicators – SHA-256 Hashes:

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

Yara Signatures

rule Wanna_Cry_Ransomware_Generic {

meta:

description = “Detects WannaCry Ransomware on disk and in virtual page”

author = “US-CERT Code Analysis Team”

reference = “not set”

date = “2017/05/12”

hash0 = “4DA1F312A214C07143ABEEAFB695D904”

strings:

$s0 = {410044004D0049004E0024}

$s1 = “WannaDecryptor”

$s2 = “WANNACRY”

$s3 = “Microsoft Enhanced RSA and AES Cryptographic”

$s4 = “PKS”

$s5 = “StartTask”

$s6 = “wcry@123”

$s7 = {2F6600002F72}

$s8 = “unzip 0.15 Copyrigh”

condition:

$s0 and $s1 and $s2 and $s3 or $s4 or $s5 or $s6 or $s7 or $s8

}

 

/*The following Yara ruleset is under the GNU-GPLv2 license (http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl-2.0.html) and open to any user or organization, as long as you use it under this license.

rule MS17_010_WanaCry_worm {

meta:

description = “Worm exploiting MS17-010 and dropping WannaCry Ransomware”

author = “Felipe Molina (@felmoltor)”

reference = “https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/41987/”

date = “2017/05/12″

strings:

$ms17010_str1=”PC NETWORK PROGRAM 1.0″

$ms17010_str2=”LANMAN1.0″

$ms17010_str3=”Windows for Workgroups 3.1a”

$ms17010_str4=”__TREEID__PLACEHOLDER__”

$ms17010_str5=”__USERID__PLACEHOLDER__”

$wannacry_payload_substr1 = “h6agLCqPqVyXi2VSQ8O6Yb9ijBX54j”

$wannacry_payload_substr2 = “h54WfF9cGigWFEx92bzmOd0UOaZlM”

$wannacry_payload_substr3 = “tpGFEoLOU6+5I78Toh/nHs/RAP”

condition:

all of them

}

Categories
Information Security>Data Breach|Uncategorized|Computer & Network Security>Vulnerabilities

Security Incident Case Study – A MSSP Run Amok

This is a case study of a security incident that occurred recently. The purpose of sharing this case study is to provide an example as to why proper security measures must be constantly validated both internally AND externally to include Managed Service Providers.

 

NIST Security Incident Response Lifecycle

 

Security Incident Overview

A valid user account (UserX) downloaded a malicious executable file on the Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) server used by employees for remote desktop access in the middle of the afternoon. The updated security software on the server blocked the file from executing and placed it into Quarantine. Upon closer inspection, after being alerted via email the next day, it was learned that the UserX account also self-created a local administrator account on the RDP server – an uncommon administrative task.

The UserX account already had Domain Administrator-level privileges and belonged to a Manager Services provider (MSSP) that is currently under contract with the Client. However, the physical user works the third shift between 11p and 7a Local. The MSSP confirmed the physical user was not working during the time of the incident.

 

Actions Performed by the Client

  1. Exported logs from RDP server and found two network addresses in two separate European countries had been logging in as UserX for at least a month.
  2. Immediately shut down the RDP server, rebuilt the server from a safe image, and restored services. Placed the RDP server behind a VPN gateway so now employees must first connect via VPN to access the RDP server resulting in better security.
  3. Audited Active Directory users, groups, and permissions to ensure appropriate permissions.
  4. Immediately forced all users, including MSSP, to change network passwords.
  5. Audited firewall for open service ports and only allowed inbound traffic from the US and three countries that Client performs business.
  6. Audited all Windows servers looking for unauthorized local administrator accounts. None found.
  7. Exported security logs from all Windows servers to identify other security breaches. None found.

All activity undertaken by Client was timely and appropriate. Kudos to the IT staff.

 

Root Cause Analysis

The situation leading up to this security incident is two-fold: (1) allowing RDP traffic directly from the Internet is inherently insecure and should always be protected by encryption, and (2) MSSP circumvented security policies currently in place on Client’s network by creating domain administrator accounts with no password complexity, expiration or lockout parameters. It was also noted that MSSP engineers shared passwords and stored them cleartext in Microsoft Excel. This created the opportunity where an unauthorized person having identified a valid username through a Windows NULL session attack could brute force guess the password without being stopped. And because every user in this group is a Domain Administrator, a successful authentication opened the entire computer network to unauthorized access.

 

Remediation

Both security incident vulnerabilities were remediated, (1) RDP is now protected by a VPN gateway, and (2) all MSSP accounts have security policies enforced to require password changes, complexity, and lockout on failed login.

Additionally, an amendment to the seven year, multi-million contract with the MSSP has been drafted, signed and countersigned stating that all MSSP personnel must abide by the security policy of the client, and any further security incident breaches directly attributed to the MSSP will immediately terminate the contract.

 

Final Observations

Always have concrete terms in your contracts with your service providers. A chain is only as strong as it’s weakest link and sometimes we take for granted that a MSSP will always act in our best interests when they themselves may be the weak link.